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Abstract  
This article examines the ways in which Australia’s global 
connections during the colonial period have shaped its 
contemporary international political identity and the implications 
of such an approach for the study of Australian foreign policy and 
international relations (IR). This is particularly pertinent due to 
recent historiographical reconceptualization of nineteenth century 
colonial networks, which suggest Australia’s connections to India 
are far more important than previously considered. These issues 
are explored through a case study of Australia’s links with India 
prior to Federation, employing a discursive analysis of public 
debate on utilizing Indian indentured laborers in tropical Northern 
Australia. 
This paper has been peer reviewed 
 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank the many people who gave their thoughts and comments 
on the various forms that this research has taken: Petra Mosmann, Julia Davis, 
Peter Davis, Stefan Petrow, Kate Brittlebank, Pamela Allen, Kanishka Jayasuriya, 
Priya Chacko, Stephanie Brookes and two anonymous reviewers. Versions of this 
paper were presented to the Australian Historical Association and the Australian 
Political Science Association in 2012.  
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Introduction: Australia’s National Identity and Foreign Policy
  
Australia occupies an ambivalent space in the world: a 
predominantly white, ‘western’ nation geographically located on the 
periphery of Asia. This has been termed by John Howard, among 
others, as a conflict between history and geography.2 Howard, 
however, rejected this as a false choice when discussing Australia’s 
position between the U.S.A. and China. Prior to Howard’s era, 
Gareth Evans and Paul Keating attempted to shift Australia’s 
international focus away from distant, great and powerful friends to 
further engagement with its region.3 The discursive emphasis was 
shifted back by Howard, who wished to be the ‘deputy sheriff’ of the 
U.S.A., though successfully engaged in Indonesia and China.4 The 
subject has been debated more broadly within Australia over the past 
few decades over the extent to which Asia represents a ‘threat’ or an 
‘opportunity’.5 What is clear, however, is that Australia’s position in 
Asia has been discussed throughout Australian history and is regarded 
as crucial to its foreign policy to this day. However, until 
comparatively recently, it was understood through colonial discourses, 
rather than an independent foreign policy. I argue here that analysis 
of Australia’s colonial relations can provide insight into the way that 
Australian identity was shaped through its external perceptions of 
Other during this formative period. I suggest that a constructivist 
approach to IR and Australian foreign policy can benefit from 
examination of the colonial period in Australia, particularly if we 
                                                 
2 http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/dr-howard-sees-nothing-but-
opportunity-in-emerging-world-order-20120410-1wmzq.html: date accessed 21 
June 2012. 
3 Bruce R. Vaughn, ‘Australia’s Strategic Identity Post-September 11 in Context’, 
Contemporary South-East Asia 25, 1 (2004): 95. 
4 http://www.economist.com/node/3908294, date accessed: 25 October 2012. 
5 See, Stephanie Brookes, ‘“Secure in our Identity”: Regional Threat and 
Opportunity in Australian Election Discourse, 1993 and 1996’, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, 58, 4 (2012): 542–556. 
Rethinking Australia’s International Past - Alexander E. Davis 
72 
consider Australian identity as postcolonial. The connection to India 
becomes particularly important in the context of recent historical 
reformulations of the nature of India’s centrality to the British 
Empire. To further illustrate the usefulness of such a perspective, I 
present an analysis of discourse on the issue of the hiring of Indian 
indentured laborers to work in tropical Northern Australia.  
 
International Relations Theory and Colonial Histories 
Traditional IR theories have broadly ignored the relations 
between colonies as outside of the scope of analysis. IR was/is based 
on the Westphalian state system, which did not cover the entirety of 
the globe until decolonization gathered pace in the 1960s. Where does 
this leave colonial histories in international relations? The answer, for 
most mainstream theorists, is nowhere. Neorealist and neoliberal 
institutionalist approaches offer no attempt to examine this period of 
Australia’s, or India’s, development. Darby and Paolini first noted in 
1994 that within IR, prior to decolonization ‘...Asia, Africa and other 
non-European territories were seen to be outside the civilized world... 
Hence, imperial relations were not international relations.’6 Colonial 
societies were not modern states as they did not hold their own 
sovereignty. The goal here is not to discuss the India or Australia as 
modern states, but how the Australian colonies were connected to 
India, and how this impacted on the Australian colonies gradual 
formation of their own ‘white’, ‘Australian’ identity within the 
geographical context of Asia. Thus, this article only attempts to 
contribute to the constructivist project in IR, through a postcolonial 
analysis which includes colonial histories. In this sense, it argues 
                                                 
6 Phillip Darby and Anthony J. Paolini, "Bridging International Relations and 
Postcolonialism", Alternatives, 19, 3 (1994): 380. 
FJHP – Volume 29 – 2013 
73 
against the ‘state as actor’ in IR approach, seen in conventional or 
‘Wendtian’ constructivism.7 
Though constructivist IR provides an opportunity to consider 
Australia’s colonial history as shaping its identity, only certain strands 
within this broad approach utilize such historical issues. ‘Wendtian’ 
constructivism, while placing emphasis on identity informing actors’ 
decisions, closes off the forming of identities as part of its analysis. 
Alexander Wendt has argued that a ‘theory of the states system need 
no more explain the existence of states than one of society need 
explain that of people’.8 This again places the pre-state period outside 
of IR. However, as Maja Zehfuss has argued, state identities are more 
complex, contradictory and unstable that Wendt’s approach suggests.9 
In the case of Australia, ‘pre-state’ identity was formed through 
experience of its external relations and perception of other colonial 
societies it came into contact with, and that to understand Australia’s 
postcolonial identity we need to understand as well its international 
colonial history.10  
This approach is not without precedent in IR. Postcolonial 
scholars examining Indian identity have argued it is necessary to 
examine the ideologies of the nationalist movement prior to 
independence in order to fully comprehend Indian foreign policy.11 
                                                 
7 Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, 
The American Political Science Review, 88, 2 (1994): 385. 
8 Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, 
385. 
9 Maja Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liason’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 7, 3 (2001): 315-348. 
10 Himadeep Muppidi, The Politics of the Global (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2004): 9. 
11 See, for example: Phillip Darby and Anthony J. Paolini, ‘Bridging 
Postcolonialism and International Relations’, Alternatives: Global, Local and Political 
19, 3 (1994): 371-295; Sankaran Krishna, ‘The Importance of Being Ironic: A 
Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory’, Alternatives, Global, 
Local, Political, 18 (1993): 385-417; L. H. M. Ling, Postcolonial International Relations: 
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And yet, the idea that Indian scholars have ‘colonized’ postcolonial 
Australian identity has not previously been considered in the same 
manner within IR, though I argue the same issues are relevant. Some 
scholars have pointed out the difficulty in locating Australia’s 
postcolonial identity. Susan Sheridan has asked ‘is Australia 
postcolonial yet?’, while Huggan suggested the question could just as 
easily be rephrased as ‘is Australia still postcolonial?’12 That these two 
questions could be asked simultaneously demonstrates primarily that 
Australia is unsure if such terms apply to it. These questions have 
been considered through literary, cultural and media studies, but IR 
has largely not engaged with this issue, and only extremely limited 
work has been done on Australian foreign policy.13 Australia as a 
                                                                                 
Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West (New York: Paltgrave, 2002); 
Himadeep Muppidi, Politics of the Global; Himadeep Muppidi, The Colonial Signs of 
International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Latha 
Varadarajan, ‘Constructivism, Identity and neoliberal (in)security’, Review of 
International Studies 30, 03 (2004): 319-341 and Itty Abraham, The Making of the 
Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London, 1998) and Priya 
Chacko, ‘The Search for a Scientific Temper: Nuclear Technology and the 
Ambivalence of India’s Postcolonial Modernity’, Review of International Studies, 37 
(2011): 185-208. 
12 Susan Sheridan, Along the Faultlines: Sex, Race and Nation in Australian Women's 
Writing 1880s-1930s (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999): 166 and Graham 
Huggan, Postcolonialism, Racism and Transnationalism (London: Oxford University 
Press, 2007): 27. 
13 Some very limited work has been done on identity issues facing settlers in 
settler-colonial societies. While Phillip Darby’s work has contributed significantly 
to postcolonial theory in IR, extremely limited work has been done Australian 
foreign policy. For an overview, see: Derek McDougall, ‘Foreign Policy Studies in 
Australia’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 55, 3 (2009): 375-393. For an 
example of a study utilizing postcolonial theory in the context of Australian 
foreign policy, see: Susanne Shech and Jane Haggis, “Postcolonialism, Identity, 
and location: being White Australian in Asia?” Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 16, 5 (1998): 615-629. Simon Philpott mentions the importance of 
postcolonial discourses in Australian foreign policy depictions of Indonesia, albeit 
very briefly, see ‘Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National 
Imagination’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 20, 46 (2001): 381. 
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settler-colonial society is not often considered ‘postcolonial’ in the 
same sense of a state such as India. However, this may be likened to 
the popular perception that ‘gender’ issues only apply to women: 
Australian identity needs to be considered ‘postcolonial’ as its identity 
was shaped through its colonial history and within colonial discourses 
of ‘race’ and racial hierarchy.  
More broadly, this historical/constructivist approach to 
identity can help us to understand what makes Australia’s region a 
‘threat’ and the great global powers of the day ‘friends’. If Australia 
cannot trust any other state’s motivations, as neorealist theory 
suggests, why continuously ally with culturally western, white states, 
over the powerful states in Asia? For neoliberal institutionalist 
theorists, the answer may lie in democracy and free trade. But why, 
then, has Australia’s relationship with India so often been considered 
‘neglected’, and prone to ill-fated attempts at ‘re-engagement’?14 
As Walker and Sobocinska have argued, Australian 
representations of Asia are frequently overdramatised, as floods or 
storms. Asia’s ‘rise’ is seen falsely as a new phenomenon, and 
ironically, has been regarded as such throughout Australian history.15 
                                                 
14 On this point with regards to Indo-Australian relations, see: For examples of 
this thread in scholarship on Indo-Australian relations, see: Meg Gurry, India: 
Australia’s Neglected Neighbor, 1947-1996 (Brisbane: Centre for the Study of 
Australia-Asia Relations, 1996); Meg Gurry, ‘Leadership and Bilateral Relations: 
Menzies and Nehru, Australia and India, 1949-1964’, Pacific Affairs, 65, 4 (1993): 
501-526; Marika Vicziany, ‘Australia-India Security Dialogues: Academic 
Leadership in the Diplomatic Vacuum’, South Asia, 23, Special Issue (2000):159-
178; Marika Vicziany (ed.), Australia-India: The Economic Links: Past, Present and 
Future (Nedlands: Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, 1993); Nihal H. 
Kurrupu, Non-Alignment and Peace Versus Military and War (New Delhi: Academic 
Foundation, 2004) and Rory Medcalf, ‘Australia and India: How to Advance’, at 
www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-and-india-how-advance, date accessed: 21 June 
2012. Wood and Leach ‘Australian Engagement with India’. 
15 David Walker and Agnieska Sobocinska, ‘Australia’s Asia: From Yellow Peril to 
Asian Century’, Walker and Sobocinska (eds), ‘Introduction: Australia’s Asia’, 
(Crawley: University of Western Australia Publishing, 2012): 1-24. For a 
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Thus, Australia’s ‘Asian encounter’ is constantly looming: imbued 
with a sense of urgency but rarely leading to action. Rather, Australia 
constantly needs to (re)engage and/or (re)discover its region,16 
repeatedly finding political events in Asia to be ‘unprecedented’.17 
Thus, there is a constant desire to engage the region to take the 
advantages of Asia, or the ‘Asian Century’, which is tempered by fear 
of failure. In contemporary politics, this has meant that Australian 
students need to learn Asian languages in order to be ‘Asia literate’,18 
and our businesses and museums needing to be ‘China ready’ for the 
impending ‘flood’ of tourists as China ‘rises’.19 These discourses 
reproduce orientalist stereotypes that have historically been at the 
foundations of Australian ideational anxieties over Self, Other and 
region. For these reasons, we need to consider the international 
influences on Australian identity during the colonial period to more 
fully understand Australia’s perception of place in the world. As is 
argued below, India presents an ideal case study due to Australia’s 




                                                                                 
discussion of representations of Asia, see: Alison Broinowski, The Yellow Lady: 
Australian Impressions of Asia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
16 Sally P. Wood and Michael Leach, ‘“Rediscovery”, “reinvigoration”, and 
“Redefinition” in perpetuity: Australian Engagement with India 1983-2011’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, 57, 4 (2011): 526-542. 
17 Walker and Sobocinska use this term, referring back to extremely similar 
comments by PMs Andrew Fisher and Julia Gillard on the ‘unprecedented’ rise of 
Asia. Walker and Sobocinska, ‘Australia’s Asia’: 1-3.  
18 This term was used in the Rudd governments report on its 2020 summit. See, 
2020 Summit Report, 
http://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/2020_summit_report_full.pdf: 370. 
19 See, for example, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-09/are-australian-
businesses-china-ready/4809802’, date accessed: 11 August, 2013.  
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Australian Identity and Foreign Policy 
Australian identity has recently been considered as an element 
of its foreign policy by numerous constructivist or critical theorists in 
IR.20 Very few, however, have performed an analysis of colonial 
Australia’s identity discourses, though such analysis has been 
performed by historians.21 Anthony Burke’s Fear of Security outlines the 
position of ‘security’ in Australian national discourse. Though much 
of his examination covers post-federation Australia, he does discuss 
the psychology of Australian settlement: Australia as a vast ‘empty’ 
island continent, situated geographically within touching distance of 
‘overpopulated’ Asia.22 Srdjan Vucetic outlines the shared ‘closeness’ 
felt towards the UK and the U.S.A., rather than the negative fear felt 
towards Asia. Thus, for Vucetic, the answer also lies in a shared 
identity that is inherently racialized: the ‘Anglosphere’. Vucetic argues 
that this shared identity felt between the U.S.A., the UK, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand is derived from a white Anglo-Saxon 
identity that arose through the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
                                                 
20 See, for example: Richard Devetak and Jacquie True, ‘Diplomatic Divergence in 
the Antipodes: Globalisation, Foreign Policy and State Identity in Australia and 
New Zealand’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 41, 2 (2006): 241-256; Anthony 
Burke, ‘Questions of Community: Australian Identity and Asian Change’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science 45, 1 (2010): 75-93. Much work on Australia’s 
contemporary challenges with asylum seekers discusses the ‘White Australia’ 
policy and colonial identities. See, for example: William Maley, Security, People-
Smuggling, and Australia’s New Afghan Refugees’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 55, 3 (2001): 351–370; Peter Gale, ‘The Refugee Crisis and Fear: Populist 
Politics and Media Discourse’, Journal of Sociology 40, 4 (2004): 321-340 and Richard 
Devetak, ‘In Fear of Refugees: The Politics of Border Protection in Australia’, The 
International Journal of Human Rights 8, 1 (2004): 101-109. 
21 This is done with very different goals in mind, but the example is instructive. 
For a thorough account, see: David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of 
Asia 1850-1939 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1999).  
22 Anthony Burke, In Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety (Annandale: Pluto 
Press Australia, 2001): 1-34.  
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century.23 This identity has shifted from one that is explicitly racialized 
to one that is explicitly anti-racist. It still exists in the foreign policy 
sense, as seen in the U.S.A.-UK ‘special relationship’ and Australia’s 
support for the ANZUS treaty.24 Burke and Vucetic make similar 
arguments in very different ways: fear plays the same constitutive role 
in Australian-Asian relations as trust does in Australian-Anglosphere 
relations.25 
 ‘Traditional’, for want of a better term, conceptions of 
Australian identity and Australia’s colonial past emphasise a masculine 
Anglo-Saxon/Celtic Australia. Colonial, nineteenth century identities 
of Australia have been discussed from several perspectives. John 
Hirst has focused on pioneer narratives of pastoralists and farmers, 
suggesting that they ‘built’ the ‘nation’.26 Geoffrey Partington has 
focused on shared ‘Britishness’ as creating the national character.27 
Russel Ward accounts for the ‘typical’ Australian through narratives 
of the independent, loyal, courageous bushman.28 Within these 
accounts, the stereotyped Australian is a rugged male living off the 
land, and little or no agency of ‘Australianness’ is given to aboriginals 
or women.29 These approaches been critiqued effectively by Richard 
White, arguing that all are invented, and reflective of the hopes, fears 
                                                 
23 Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of Racialized Identity in International 
Relations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
24 Ibid.  
25 For a similar argument with regards to Indonesia specifically, see Simon 
Philpott, ‘Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National Imagination’, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, 3 (2001): 371.  
26 John Hirst, ‘The Pioneer Legend’, in John Carroll (ed.), Intruders in the Bush: The 
Australian Quest for National Identity (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992): 
14-37. 
27 Geoffrey Partington, The Australian Nation: Its British and Irish Roots (Melbourne: 
Transaction Publishers, 1994) 
28 Russel Ward, The Australian Legend (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1966) 
29 Jeff Archer, ‘Situating Australian National Identity in Theory and Practice’, in 
Geoffrey Stokes, The Politics of Identity in Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997): 28. 
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and ideologies of their inventor: rather than an ‘authentic’ 
Australian.30 Within Australian Foreign policy discourse, there 
remains a sense that ‘we’ can trust those who are most like ‘us’: the 
‘great and powerful friends’, the UK and the US.31 The pioneer 
narratives above are the very early genesis of this approach. Inherent 
in viewing the US and the UK as more trustworthy than the states in 
Australia’s region is the idea the major powers in Asia (India, China, 
Indonesia) are less trustworthy. Thus, within elements of Australian 
policy, racialized identities have had lasting impacts on the policy 
options which Australia perceives as the best way to provide for 
security.  
 Thus, foreign policy positions are underpinned by 
national identity, which is constructed through Australia’s historically-
rooted identity logic. These can be analysed through discourses of 
national identity: stories Nation States tell themselves about who they 
are and what they should be. Analysis of the history of these 
narratives can reveal their origins and enable us to better understand 
how they continue to play out in the present. This can also allow for 
far deeper understanding of Australia’s perceived place in the world 
than a purely positivist ‘scientific’ approach to material concerns. This 
paper seeks to examine just one small aspect of Australian history: the 
attempt by the Australian colonies to use indentured labourers from 
India. I have three specific goals: to examine how Australian identity 
was shaped through the Indian connection, to argue that Australian 
discourse on India reveals ambivalence in Australian colonial identity, 
though racialized fear in different forms was ultimately dominant and 
                                                 
30 Richard White, Inventing Australia: Images and Identity, 1688-1980 (North Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 1981): viii. See also, Richard White, ‘Inventing Australia 
Revisited’, in Wayne Hudson and Geoffrey Bolton (eds), Creating Australia (St 
Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1997): 13. 
31 This has varied in emphasis over the course of different governments. For a 
discussion of ‘traditionalism’ in Australian foreign policy, see Michael Wesley and 
Tony Warren, ‘Wild Colonial Ploys? Currents of Thought in Australian Foreign 
Policy’, Australian Journal of Political Science 35, 1, (2000): 9.  
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to begin to examine how colonial / postcolonial ideational issues 
affect contemporary Australian foreign policy. 
  
Colonial History and Foreign Policy 
In order to examine the usefulness of understanding 
Australian identity and foreign policy through colonial history I 
analyse two issues. First, the historiography of colonial networks, 
which reveals Australia’s colonial history is far more intertwined with 
its region that has previously been acknowledged in IR. Second, I 
analyse how these connections shaped Australian identity through a 
case study of discourse on Indian indentured labourers. Finally, to 
show the relevance of postcolonial issues to contemporary politics, I 
briefly consider contemporary India-Australia relations.  
If we accept each state as having a unique and malleable 
identity which shifts in relation to its position in the international 
system, then historical processes of identity formation can allow for 
temporally deeper analysis of identity. Thus, I employ a discursive 
analysis drawing on two techniques. First, what David Campbell 
described as examining the political consequences of ‘adopting one 
mode of representation over another’ with regard to depictions of 
British India and Indian labourers.32 Furthermore, I also draw on 
Edward Said’s work Orientalism, as discourse on India in this period 
relied heavily on colonial stereotypes of ‘Orient’ as Australia’s 
‘irrational’, dangerous Other.33 Within Australia, the obvious Other in 
the formation of a new, Australian ‘white’ identity were the internal 
aboriginal peoples. However, once we consider recent advances in the 
historical conception of colonial networks, external Others become 
                                                 
32 D. Campbell, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 84. 
33 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin 
1995). 
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‘closer’ than previously acknowledged, and can be viewed as 
impacting on Australia’s perception of its place in the colonial 
experience and by extension, the world.  
 
Between Geography and which History? The Historiography of 
Colonial Networks 
Recent historical research has examined India’s centrality as a 
‘hub’ to the British empire. Christopher Bayly, Thomas Metcalf, 
Robert Blyth and Tony Ballantyne have shown the importance of 
India to the British empire as a ‘hub’, projecting power, goods and 
people around the empire, allowing Indians to act as ‘colonizing’, as 
well as ‘colonized’, peoples.34 The Indian network flourished after the 
Indian Rebellion and faded after World War One.35 Ballantyne has 
clarified the recentring of the empire by arguing for a different 
conception of the British empire. He writes that the empire had 
previously been viewed as a ‘hub and spoke’ system in which London 
was the ‘hub’ and various colonies were ‘spokes’.36 Ballantyne 
                                                 
34 See Thomas Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-
1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Thomas Metcalf, ‘The 
Empire Recentered: India in the Indian Ocean Arena’, in Gregory Blue, Martin P. 
Bunton and Ralph C. Croizier, Colonialism and the Modern World, (London: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002): 25-39. Richard Blyth, The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa and 
the Middle East, 1858-1947 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). The work of 
Christopher Bayly is also particularly informative to the perspective of this paper. 
See: Christopher Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1870-1914: Global Connections 
and Comparisons (Malden: Wiley, 2004); Christopher Bayly, Empire and Information: 
Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Christopher Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The 
British Empire and the World 1780-1830 (London: Longman, 1989). 
35 Metcalf, Imperial Connections: 1-6, 204-221; Blyth, Empire of the Raj: 2-8. 
36 Tony Ballantyne, ‘Rereading the Archive and Opening up the Nation State: 
Colonial Knowledge in South Asia’, in Antoinette Burton (ed.), After the Imperial 
Turn: Thinking with and Through the Nation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003): 
112-3.  
Rethinking Australia’s International Past - Alexander E. Davis 
82 
describes the empire as a complicated web, consisting of ‘horizontal 
filaments that run among various colonies in addition to “vertical” 
connections between the metropole and individual colonies’. India 
was a sub-imperial centre in its own right.37 Metcalf takes this 
approach and expands upon India’s role within it. He emphasizes the 
sub-imperial role of India within this system, writing that ‘if not quite 
a “spider” sitting at the heart of the web, India [was]... more than just 
one of the many colonial “knots” that may be said to constitute that 
web’.38 It has often been noted that Australia relied on India’s 
shipping in its earliest years to survive.39 However, the connections 
between India and Australia ran far deeper and longer than just these 
early food shipments – they continued, and indeed strengthened, as 
Australian identity was shaped.40 If London was the most important 
city to Australian colonies in the twentieth century, Calcutta was 
surely the second most important. These connections allow the 
opportunity to study Australian perceptions of Self through the 
colonies’ dealings with India, rather than just the more obvious 
connection with London, and how this affected the formation of 
Australian identity.  
                                                 
37 Tony Ballantyne, ‘Rereading the Archive and Opening up the Nation State: 
Colonial Knowledge in South Asia’, 112-3. 
38 Metcalf, Imperial Connections: 7-8. For some examples of transnational history 
involving Australia, see, for example: M. Lake and H. Reynolds, Drawing the Global 
Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the Question of Racial Equality (Carlton: 
Melbourne University Publishing, 2008) and Anne Curthoys and Marilyn Lake 
(eds), Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective (Canberra: ANU E Press, 
2005). See also: Malcolm Allbrook, ‘“Imperial Family”: The Prinseps, Empire and 
Colonial Government in India and Australia’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Griffith 
University, 2008). 
39 For some examples, see Harold J. Finnis, ‘Early Indian-Australian Relations’, 
Proceedings of the Australian Geographical Society, 40, 1 (1963): 39-42 and Geoffrey 
Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance shaped Australia’s History, rev. ed. 
(Melbourne: Macmillan, 2001): 57-59, 62-63. 
40 For further historical detail on this period and the broader argument, see 
Alexander E. Davis, ‘Sibling Rivalry: the India-Australia Relationship’, 1858-1901’ 
(Unpublished MA Thesis, Hobart 2011). 
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Australia’s relationship with India is an ideal case study for 
how the external Other in Australian thought defined at this very 
early stage how Australia began to see its role in the world. Analysis 
of Australia’s relationship with India, then, can begin to show us how 
and why Australia’s national identity was formed as conceptually 
‘white’ though colonial discourses. Fear in Australian society of the 
Other has mostly been discussed in scholarship with regard to China 
and Chinese emigration.41 India, as the colonial ‘hub’, was never likely 
to invade in the military sense, but India’s place in the empire created 
the possibility of Indians emigrating to Australia as labourers, as had 
occurred in other British colonies. Through these connections, we 
can also view Australia’s perception of India’s place in the empire, as 
an example of the colonial Other. India’s position in the Australian 
colonial imagination reveals the early political, cultural and discursive 
space in which Australian identity was formed, providing historical 
and theoretical insight into Australia’s contemporary identity, which 
in turn defines contemporary discourses of Australian foreign policy.  
Debate on Indian labour centred on whether they should be 
allowed in the far north of the country, or not all. Indian indentured 
labour had previously only been allowed into colonies with primarily 
indigenous populations such as Fiji, Guyana and Natal. This took 
place in the context of a broader debate: was Australia ‘of Europe’ or 
‘of Asia’? This debate can therefore be regarded as a pre-text of 
contemporary debates on Australian identity. To what extent was 
proximity to Asia a threat or an opportunity? The Othering of far 
away, potential, Indian labourers reveals Australian national identity 
being formed conceptually as ‘white’, while fitting into wider 
nineteenth century notions of racial hierarchy. Examination of this 
formative period of Australian identity reveals how the separate but 
connected states of the British empire affected the development of 
one another’s international identity.  
                                                 
41 Andrew Markus, Fear and Hatred: Purifying Australia and California, 1850-1901 
(Sydney: Hale & Ironmonger, 1979). 
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Indian Indentured Labour in Australia and the Empire 
It should be noted here, that some Indians did come to 
Australia as labourers. My concern, however, is with external 
influence of India on Australian identity, and so I will focus solely on 
the imagined Indian ‘coolies’. Only a small number of Indians were 
allowed into Australia prior to 1901. From approximately 1862 to 
1901, the possibility of allowing large numbers of Indian indentured 
labourers was debated heavily at the governmental level.42 The 
Queensland Indian Coolie Act of 1862 facilitated the immigration of 
Indian labour to work in northwest Queensland on cotton and sugar 
cane plantations. The act was ‘extended’ in 1882 and repealed in 1886 
without any migration ever taking place.43 There was a considerable 
backlash against the prospect of Indian migration, resulting in these 
acts being repealed in 1886. South Australia also considered having 
Indian labourers work to assist with the development of the Northern 
Territory.  
There have been extensive studies of the mechanics of Indian 
indentured labour and their experiences, the most influential of which 
is Hugh Tinker’s A New System of Slavery. Tinker eloquently shows 
how the indentured labour system came to prominence after the end 
of the slave trade, and the appalling conditions to which coolies were 
subjected.44 Approximately 1.3 million Indians migrated as labourers 
around the empire. 500,000 went to Mauritius, over 400,000 in the 
                                                 
42 Salim Lakha, ‘Australia’ in Brij V. Lal, Peter Reeves and Rajesh Rai (eds), The 
Encyclopaedia of the Indian Diaspora (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2006): 
383-388. 
43 Salim Lakha, ‘Australia’, 383.  
44 Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas 1830-
1920 (Hansib: Oxford University Press, 1994). For a critique of the dominance of 
Tinker’s work, arguing for greater nuance and understanding of Coolie labour in 
their own right, see Clare Anderson, ‘Convicts and Coolies: Rethinking 
Indentured Labour in the Nineteenth Century’, Slavery and Abolition, 30, 1 (2009): 
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British West Indies, 150,000 to Natal and 60,000 to Fiji. On top of 
this, 4.25 million Indians went to Burma, Malaya and Ceylon.45 The 
huge numbers of Indian labourers that were transported around the 
empire gave weight to the idea that Indian labour might be used in 
Australia, particularly when Fiji took on such labourers in 1880. 
Colonial perceptions of geography also added to this belief: Indian 
labourers were regarded as appropriate for a certain type of labour in 
tropical regions, and Australia’s north was considered as part of this 
Asian tropical geography.46 
 
‘Coolie’ Labour for Queensland: For and Against 
Queensland began dealing with the Indian government over a 
renewed plan to use Indian labour in the 1880s. Proposed regulations 
were sent in early 1882, which were then amended by India, but were 
not ultimately acceptable to the Queensland government. The 
legislation was delayed for a further three years by a dispute over 
Queensland’s desire for the Indian labourers to be forced home after 
their period of indenture.47 There were two points that the 
Queensland government was uncomfortable with. First, Queensland 
did not wish to pay the salary of the Chief Protector because the 
person in this role was to be chosen by India. Their second, and 
                                                 
45 Surendra Bhana, Indentured Indian Emigrants to Natal 1860-1902: A Study Based on 
Ship’s Lists (New Delhi: Promilla & Co, 1991). Lance Brennan, John McDonald 
and Ralph Shlomowitz, ‘The Geographic and Social Origins of Indian Indentured 
Labourers in Mauritius, Natal, Fiji, Guyana and Jamaica’, South Asia, 21, Special 
Issue (1998): 39-71; David Northrup, Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 
1834–1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 156–57. 
46 Walker, Anxious Nation: 23-25.  
47 Tinker, New System of Slavery: 271-2. This is not intended as a complete analysis 
of this historical issue. I have, however, completed such a discussion in my MA 
thesis. See Davis, ‘Sibling Rivalry’. 
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major concern, was changing the regulations to prevent Indian 
labourers from staying in Queensland at the end of their indenture.48 
Thomas McIlwraith, the premier at the time, emphasized the 
government’s concerns over Indians staying in Queensland.49 He 
argued privately in negotiations with Calcutta that the regulations had 
neglected to prevent Indians labourers who had finished their period 
of indenture from working outside of tropical and semi-tropical areas. 
Essentially, the Queensland government was trying to ensure that no 
Indians could become free to work within the colony as white 
inhabitants would. This perspective is confirmed later when this 
request was disputed by India. McIlwraith writes:  
In making the amendments to which your Government has taken 
exception, this government was influenced solely by the desire to 
confine these labourers to tropical and semi-tropical agriculture... 
by compelling them to return to India at the expiration of their 
engagements... and thereby prevent them from mixing with the 
European population in the several towns in the colony.50 
Clearly, McIlwraith was concerned about Indians becoming a 
permanent part of the Queensland population, by referring to ‘mixing 
with the European population’. This was further clarified when in the 
second letter he wrote of his concerns about the Indians staying in 
the colony, stating that ‘…you will at once see how necessary it is to 
guard against the indiscriminate employment of this labour by other 
than those for whose particular benefit it is to be introduced.’51 
                                                 
48 McIlwraith to Buck, 21 June, 1882, in L/Public and Judicial Files (hereafter 
PJ)/6/12/567 in India Office Records (hereafter IOR). 
49 J. X. Jobson, ‘Palmer, Sir Arthur Hunter (1819-1898)’, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 5 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1974): 390-392 and Don Dingan, 'McIlwraith, Sir Thomas (1835 
- 1900)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 5 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1974):161-164. 
50 McIlwraith to Buck, 21 June, 1882, in L/PJ/6/12/567, in IOR. 
51 McIlwraith to Buck, 21 June, 1882, in L/PJ/6/12/567, in IOR. 
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‘Indiscriminate employment’, an extremely unusual phrase, implies 
that the Queensland government was concerned about Indians 
becoming a part of the general population and lowering the wages of 
local workers.52 If the Indian labourers could not be sent home 
immediately, they would surely become a permanent feature of North 
Queensland.  
In 1883 Indian labour became a divisive electoral issue. 
McIlwraith was challenged by Samuel Griffith, leader of the Liberal 
party. McIlwraith supported Indian labour on the condition that the 
labourers were confined to tropical agriculture and had no choice but 
to leave the colony after the term of their indenture. By confining 
them to one type of labour and enforcing their subsequent departure, 
McIlwraith tried to calm fears that hiring such labourers would cause 
significant drops in wages. Much Australian economic thought at the 
time was based on the belief that increases in migration might 
increase unemployment or force wages down.53  
Griffith was opposed to all coloured labour in the 
Queensland, but particularly Indian. One Liberal party candidate for 
North Brisbane, William Brookes, was concerned that Indian 
labourers might bring diseases such as measles, smallpox and cholera 
to Queensland. Disease, however, did not scare him as much as the 
Indians themselves, stating that ‘If all their terrible epidemics were to 
come together they would not constitute so terrible a calamity to 
Queensland as the permanent establishment within our territory of 
coloured labour’.54 According to newspaper reports, this particularly 
                                                 
52 McIlwraith to Buck, 6 May 1883, in L/PJ/6/69/455, in IOR. 
53 Fear for wages related to non-white immigration had long been a driver for 
trade unions to support discriminatory policies. See, for example, David Pope and 
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Labour Market, 1870-1891’, Labour History, 50 (1986): 1-27 
54 The Brisbane Courier, 18 August, 1883: 5.  
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vitriolic comment against Indian labour was met with applause.55 He 
went on to state that death from these diseases would be preferable to 
living with Indian labour, as the coolies would take any job for less 
pay, leaving the white colonists with no choice but to return home.56 
Griffith also made public speeches in opposition to Indian 
labour, raising his fears that the employer of Indian labourers might 
die or become insolvent and that there would be 20,000 Indians 
‘wandering about’, unable to feed themselves or work.57 Were this 
scenario to occur, the government (civilized as it was) would have no 
choice but to pay to feed them. In this speech, starvation is portrayed 
as natural and common to Indian people, as Griffith notes the 
likelihood of this scenario, because, ‘in one province of India alone 
three million of them died from famine lately’.58 Griffith played the 
‘jobs’ card as well – raising another fear that Indian labourers might 
take the jobs of white labourers. Griffith and Brookes may have been 
playing to the crowd in these cases, overstating their cases to appeal 
to their supporters. These public speeches were, after all, campaign 
events. This discourse on Indian labourers is reflective of an identity 
forming in Queensland that was inherently white, and exclusionary on 
this basis. Through Othering one group, a politician implicitly 
presents ‘sameness’ to the crowd they are addressing.59 Griffith and 
Brookes construct the possible Indian labourers a mob, an 
indistinguishable mass of 20,000: aimlessly wandering northern 
Queensland, destroying civilization, taking ‘our’ jobs, riddled with 
disease, infecting white workers, stealing ‘our’ young girls, unable to 
feed themselves, draining state resources – parasitic on the state of 
                                                 
55 The Brisbane Courier, 18 August, 1883: 5. 
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Queensland. These statements construct, reinforce and sustain 
identity through the function of creating a security threat.60 
Fearmongering may be an easy and well established way to 
whip up support from a crowd, but it cannot work unless the fears 
are already there in some form. The citizens of Queensland already 
had an identity, but the political and social climate of the time, 
through colonial discourses and prelisting fears of wage collapse due 
to heavy migration, made them ready to hear these words of Griffith 
and Brookes. India in Australia’s external relations occupied the space 
of a threat, as well as that of a colonial partner. The imperial 
connection drew Indian people ‘closer’ to Australian thought. The 
paternalism and the stereotyping of Indians of these statements is not 
unusual for the time in the context of colonial discourses. They would 
be a burden that the Queensland people would have to carry. 
Queensland, though, did not have to bear this ‘white man’s burden’ if 
they did not wish to. Brookes and Griffith empowered the 
Queensland electors with the choice to say ‘no’. 
Of course, the debate was not completely one sided: 
McIlwraith put his case forcefully as well, albeit without ultimately 
winning the support of the majority of the voting public. When 
addressing the issue in a town hall meeting he began by attacking the 
populism of Griffith, stating that ‘popularity hunting politicians... 
have always found a strong point in starting bad feeling between the 
races.’61 He countered Griffith’s argument that Indians would take 
away ‘white jobs’ by pointing out that no white men would want to 
work in the sugar plantations.62 They certainly would not do so on an 
indentured labourer’s wage. Gilbert Smith wrote from Victoria to the 
Brisbane Courier to write of his experiences in India with Indian labour. 
                                                 
60 Campbell, Writing Security, 100. 
61 The Brisbane Courier, 8 August1883: 4-5. 
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He assuaged fears by writing that Indians were hard-working, steady 
and would have no desire to mix with the white population.63  
In private, however, McIlwraith had ensured that Indian 
labourers would be forced to leave after their term of indenture. 
McIlwraith ultimately wanted to hire the Indian labourers, pay them 
little, confine them to the tropics and remove them immediately 
following their contract: thus aiding the sugar growers without 
allowing permanent settlement. The argument between McIlwraith 
and Griffith was conducted within the discourse of colonial racial 
ideology. It was over the extent to which Australia should be ‘white’, 
and European, or the extent to which it was part of Asia and whether 
or not the Indian connection could be of value to (tropical) Northern 
Australia. Two broad constructions of these Indian labourers were 
possible: one purely as the irrational, threatening Asian Other, and 
another which, while still accepting the discursive construction Indian 
labourers as threatening, suggesting that economic opportunity 
mitigated this threat. Others found no economic opportunity, indeed 
the saw the opposite, an unnecessary threat to local wages. 
The intersections between race and class here require some 
consideration. McIlwraith infuriated the working class by his attempt 
to bring in Indian labour and was defeated easily in the July 
elections.64The fear that white jobs may be lost to cheaper Indian 
immigrants was an element of Griffith’s victory. It is telling that it was 
these particular Brisbane seats and this particular crowd which so 
happily welcomed the approach of Brookes and Griffiths. As argued 
by Stephanie Brookes,65 Australia has long narrated its region through 
different perceptions economic opportunity and fear for its security. 
In this case, the inner-city population of Brisbane had little personal 
stake in the development of North Queensland, allowing narratives of 
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race to dominate their thoughts in the absence of any personal 
economic benefit. Griffith and Brookes won the two north-Brisbane 
seats on offer.66 While North Queensland sugar growers would have 
benefitted, it was still felt necessary to insist labourers return home 
immediately after their indentures ended. Other aspects of the 
McIlwraith government’s labour policy, its planned transcontinental 
railway and allegations of corruption in land grants also counted 
against it heavily in the election.67  
India may have been Australia’s colonial partner, but it was 
also perceived as threatening. Indian emigration was stopped by 
widespread opposition, from political leaders in Queensland and from 
the voters who elected them. When the vision of Australia as a ‘white’ 
nation, became institutionalised just over 15 years later the door was 
finally shut on Indian indentured labour to Queensland. Of course, 
the concept of a ‘white Australia’ was just that, a concept. The 
Australian colonies did have an indigenous population, but they were 
not shown the same level of respect as other non-white populations 
in the British empire. Queensland still took Pacific Island labour, but 
did so partly because it was far easier to enforce their departure. 
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‘Coolies’ for South Australia?  
The possibility of Indian labour in Australia did not end with 
the fall of McIlwraith. South Australia undertook its own separate 
negotiations with the Indian government concerning the possibility of 
hiring Indian labour to work in the Northern Territory, which was 
then being managed by the South Australian government.68 Attempts 
were made up until the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901 to bring 
in Indian labour. South Australia was keen to provide sugar planters 
with an option to move to the Northern Territory by offering a steady 
stream of cheap workers. There was some continued support for 
Indian labour. An editorial in the South Australian Register asserted: 
To say that it were better that tropical Australia should not be 
developed at all than that coloured labour should be introduced is 
as unreasonable as it is unpatriotic.69  
The perceived threat to Australia from non-white immigration did not 
apply to the Northern Territory: there was simply no ‘civilization’ to 
be protected. 
This conception of Australia aligns with beliefs about race and 
climate that were a key part of colonial discourses of the period. 
Between 1896 and 1901, Parsons remained vocal on the subject, 
writing several ‘letters to the editor’ of the South Australian Register.70 In 
1897 he questioned whether Englishmen could ‘…work the fields 
during an Abyssinian or Society Island Summer? The question of 
labour is one of race, climate, and natural laws.’71 Again, he followed 
                                                 
68 For a discussion of this period, see Alan Powell, Far Country: A short History of the 
Northern Territory, Centenary Edition (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2000) 
69 The South Australian Register, 27 April, 1892: 5. 
70 The South Australian Register became just ‘The Register’ post-federation.  
71 South Australian Register (Adelaide, SA: 1839 – 1900), 2 September 1896: 6. 
FJHP – Volume 29 – 2013 
93 
this with calls for Indian labour, stating also that it was the only 
coloured labour that he had ever advocated.72 
 
One year later, Parsons wrote to the SA Register again, stating 
that he was in favour of the white Australia policy – so far as 
citizenship and permanent residence were concerned. He continued 
by clarifying that federation would not ‘alter the climate of the north 
coast of the Northern Territory,’ asserting that the state of the 
Northern Territory economy was disastrous, and that the necessary 
work could only be done by coloured labour. He finally noted that 
‘[a]lways remembering that by making friendly arrangements for 
return it is quite possible to preserve a “White Australia”’.73 
Parsons stated his case again in August of 1901, once the 
Immigration Restriction Act had been passed and his battle was surely 
lost, perhaps more to defend his own opinions that to bring about 
change: 
Utilization of the land is the best title to rightful ownership. It is 
the only justification for a white race to retain the tropical area of 
Australia, to the exclusion of Asiatics from a vast outlet for their 
crowded and often starving populations. Australia geographically 
belongs to them, for Australasia is South Asia.74 
Even once the subject was essentially settled, Parsons was in favour 
of Indian labour in the Northern Territory, through arguing that 
whites could only justify owning the land if they developed it. This 
was based in a different perception of ‘Australia’ – the tropical north 
is not part of Australia if it is not used – rather it is Australasia. ‘White 
Australia’ then becomes possible even if Northern Australia were 
inhabited by Indians because it is not really ‘Australia’. Parsons 
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expressed through colonial ideology the position that Australia was 
more a part of ‘Asia’ than ‘Europe’. As such, his perception of Indian 
labour issue was fundamentally different from those viewing the 
whole of Australia as outside ‘Asia’. 
 ‘Shared history’ has often been used in recent discourse to tie 
India and Australia together.75 When we look at the prominence of 
India as a threat in Australian colonial identity discourse a greatly 
different picture emerges: the spectre of India hovered over Australia 
as its identity grew through the 1800s, drawn closer by India’s central 
position to the British empire. If we consider this in context to 
Australia’s contemporary relations with India, these ambivalences 
become even more important to Australia’s contemporary foreign 
policy. In the postcolonial period, Indian and Australian diplomats in 
the 1950s and 1960 struggled to understand one another, largely due 
to colonial experiences.76 This ‘shared history’ is ultimately colonial 
history, and is largely responsible for the contemporary relationship 
which disappoints so many Australian strategic thinkers and policy 
makers. This period needs to be interrogated if we are to understand 
postcolonial Australian foreign policy and identity.  
 
Conclusion: Colonial Identities and Australian International 
Thought  
The ambivalence in Australia’s colonial identity through 
federation with regard to India was based on conceptions of the 
Australian Self: as part ‘Asian’ and part ‘European’. While the severe 
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immigration restrictions placed on Indians in 1901 would suggest that 
India primarily was primarily viewed as threatening, other evidence 
suggests that the position of India in Australian colonial thought was 
more convoluted. India was a crucial lifeline to Australia in the early 
1800s. In its distance, India could be a benign friend to Australia. 
However, the thought of Indian labourers physically entering 
Australia aroused racial fears in large sections of the Australian 
population, evoking imagery of the over-populated, underprivileged 
Orient invading the open spaces of the Australian colonies. Parsons 
and McIlwraith illustrate a separate school of thought that was slightly 
more inclined to view the Indian connection as an opportunity: 
considering indentured labourers to be a possible economic benefit to 
Australia. Parsons’ approach is particularly important as he went as 
far as to argue that tropical northern Australia was more ‘Asian’ than 
‘Australian’, concluding that this economic opportunity would not 
violate the White Australia policy. Thus, some were able to view 
Australia’s geography as an opportunity for development, the 
overwhelming discourse was one of Indian labourers as a threat to 
Australia’s ‘white’ identity. 
Australia’s national identity has historically been obsessed 
with ‘race’. This issue has gradually been overcome (at least in an 
explicit sense) in Australian domestic politics as well as in its foreign 
policy. Though Australia’s national identity has shifted from explicitly 
racist to explicitly anti-racist, the perceived policy options have been 
slower to shift than nationalist discourse. I argue that, while this 
explicitly racial approach to Australian national identity has been 
filtered out, the broader privileged position of the ‘Anglosphere’ 
manifests itself in the popular perception within Australia that distant 
great and powerful friends are the best hope for maintaining peace 
and security. In this sense, colonial discourses from the nineteenth 
century can be viewed as crucial in forming Australian national 
identity and therefore have had a lasting effect on the discursive and 
cultural space in which Australian foreign policy decisions are made. 
Australian engagement with Asia is still tempered by similar 
Rethinking Australia’s International Past - Alexander E. Davis 
96 
constructions of threat and opportunity. The analysis of the historical 
foundation of Australian identity narratives can better help us to 
understand Australia’s contemporary foreign policy. It is for these 
reasons in particular that we need to consider Australian identity, 
foreign policy and India-Australia relations as explicitly postcolonial.  
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